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This paper examines how regulators set local prices in response to the changes brought 
on by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecom Act”). We are particularly 
interested in the extent to which state regulators set prices that promoted efficiency or 
were influenced by private-interest groups who had secured rents under a regime of 
regulated monopoly. Using regional Bell operating company (RBOC) data, our empirical 
results indicate that private interests continue to influence the structure of retail and 
wholesale prices, although their influence appears to be waning. We find that changes to 
the regulatory structure, as measured by federal approval of RBOC Section 271 
applications that open up markets to competition and universal service subsidies, resulted 
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  1“Today, with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with our future. We will help to 
create an open marketplace where competition and innovation can move as quick as light.  
An industry that is already one-sixth of our entire economy will thrive. It will create 




This paper examines how regulators set local retail and wholesale prices in response to 
the changes brought on by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act").  We 
are particularly interested in the extent to which state regulators set prices that promoted 
efficiency or were influenced by private-interest groups who had secured rents under a 
regime of regulated monopoly.
2  Understanding how markets and regulators respond to 
legislative mandates that expose regulated industries to competition informs policy 
makers in the U.S. and abroad as they move to restructure other regulated industries. 
  The Telecom Act is often criticized as a failure (for example, see Weissman, 2002 
and Crandall, 2005).  Detractors claim that its main legacies are additional layers of 
regulation and protracted litigation, providing little competition and few of the promised 
consumer benefits. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), however, reports 
that by June, 2002 11.4 percent of all wire-line end users subscribed to service provided 
by entrants.
3  In addition, the number of end-user landlines decreased by about five 
hundred thousand lines between 1999 and 2002, while the number of wireless telephone 
                                                 
1 Remarks by President William J. Clinton at the Signing Ceremony for the Telecommunications Act, 
February 8,
 1996 (Clinton, 1996). 
2 Micro-level competition data would add to the analysis we undertake, but such data are commercially 
sensitive and not available to independent researchers at this point in time. 
3 About 72 percent of competitive lines were provided using incumbent facilities (FCC, 2005a). While 
competitors provided service to more residential and single-line business customers (11 million) than multi-
line business customers (10.5 million), entrant’s market share was higher in the multi-line business (22 
percent) than residential and single-line business segment (8 percent).   
  2subscriptions nearly doubled from 79.7 million to over 138.8 million.
4  Nascent 
competitors using new technologies, such as voice over Internet protocol, were also 
threatening to become important sources of competition as well.   
Prior to the Telecom Act, most state and local governments treated local 
telephone service as a regulated monopoly and blocked competitive entry.  State 
regulators also adopted systems of implicit and explicit subsidies whose stated goal was 
to increase subscribership.
5  The Telecom Act forced states to allow entry and mandated 
that incumbents share network effects with entrants by interconnecting and exchanging 
traffic with their competitors.
6  Regulators were required to revise universal service 
programs by replacing implicit subsidies with explicit subsidies, and allowing entrants, as 
well as incumbents, access to explicit universal service subsidies.   
  The Telecom Act attempted to jumpstart competition by permitting entrants to 
resell incumbent services and/or provide service over incumbent facilities.  Entrants 
could lease incumbent network elements, such as the local loop to the household, at cost-
based wholesale prices, which addressed concerns that telecom networks contain 
essential facilities that exhibit characteristics consistent with a natural monopoly, and 
fostered retail competition. While its stated goal was to develop a deregulated 
competitive communications marketplace, the Telecom Act required that federal and 
                                                 
4 While many factors contributed to the growth of wireless, the Telecom Act’s provisions requiring 
interconnection and symmetrical, cost-based rates for traffic exchange likely played an important role. (See 
47 U.S.C. 252(d)(2)).  The FCC (2005a) reports that by the end of 2004, competitor’s market share grew to 
18.5 percent, the number of end-user land lines experienced over a six-percent reduction compared to 1999, 
and the number wireless telephone subscriptions had grown to over 181 million. 
5 Riordan (2002) cautions that “cross subsidy” is often used loosely and ignores the potential impact 
network externalities and economies of scale have on efficient pricing of services. In addition, examples of 
urban-to-rural and business-to-residential cross subsidies often ignore profits from unregulated services.   
6 As discussed in footnote 4, in doing so, the Telecom Act required symmetrical, cost-based rates for 
charges competitors pay each other when a call is initiated on one carrier’s network and terminated on 
another’s.  
  3state regulators develop and oversee an entirely new layer of rules regulating 
interconnection and the wholesale of network elements. 
  The new rules and regulations potentially undermine the structure of retail prices 
in place when the Telecom Act became law.
7  Because entrants target customers who 
generate subsidies, competitive entry may force regulators to rebalance prices to ensure 
the incumbent’s solvency.  Cost-based wholesale prices and the Telecom Act’s other 
market-opening provisions accelerate the competitive process, giving regulators with the 
desire to maintain the status quo the incentive to set wholesale prices at levels that exceed 
costs.
8  Such incentives call into question whether the Telecom Act, as implemented, is 
truly deregulatory or simply a form of ostensible deregulation where regulators adopt 
new regulations that, on the surface, appear to promote competition, but in practice 
maintain the status quo.   
Two theoretical literatures help explain state regulators’ implementation of the 
Telecom Act.  The public-interest theory of regulation is based on the normative premise 
that regulators intervene in markets to correct inefficiencies (Ramsey, 1927; Baumol and 
Bradford, 1970).  According to Noll (1989), deregulation occurs when the costs of 
regulation exceed the transaction costs of deregulation and the costs of any market failure 
that remain.  For our study, the theory suggests we should observe improved market 
performance as regulators implement the Telecom Act’s provisions.  By contrast, the 
private-interest theory argues that regulation is a forum where rents are created and 
                                                 
7 Noll and Smart (1991) argue that residential and rural constituents use their persuasive powers to ensure 
urban-business customers pay retail prices that exceed cost so regulators can reduce the prices residential 
and rural customers pay for electricity, gas and local telephone service. Palmer (1992), Maher (1999) and 
Knittle (2004) test for the presence of implicit cross subsidy in local telephone prices and present evidence 
that is consistent with business and urban customers cross-subsidizing residential and rural customers. 
8 Alternatively, state regulators could adopt an aggressive universal service program that taxes retail prices 
and provides explicit subsidies to consumer groups who enjoyed below-cost prices before the Act. 
  4influential constituencies compete for these rents by offering political support for 
favorable regulation (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983; Noll, 1989).  
Politically savvy consumer groups and regulated incumbents, who secured rents under 
the old regime, may actively oppose state regulators as they implement the Telecom 
Act’s market-opening provisions. The implication is that political influence leads to sub-
optimal regulated prices.  
Our empirical analysis distinguishes between the different theoretical 
explanations by estimating the effects public-interest and private-interest proxies exert on 
regulated prices.  Generally, our approach is similar to studies by Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999) and Heinemann and Schuller (2004), who use economic, political and institutional 
variables to explain regulatory and supervisory reform in the banking sector.  Our paper 
also resembles studies by Smart (1994), Abel (2002) and De Figueiredo, Jr. and Edwards 
(2004), who provide political-economy explanations of entry and access prices, 
respectively, in local telephone markets.  These latter studies, however, do not account 
for the structure of prices across consumer groups and different areas within a state, and 
as such, do not adequately capture the trade-offs facing regulators when setting prices 
that affect competition.  Moreover, all the studies above typically proxy political effects 
with variables that measure the size of the interest group rather than the group’s ability to 
effectively organize consumer surplus into political support (i.e., their “political 
influence”).  In this paper, we estimate how political influence, measured by the price-
cost margin for the specific consumer group, affects prices for other groups and regions 
while controlling for costs, demand and interest-group size. 
  5We estimate retail and wholesale price equations for the regional Bell operating 
companies (RBOCs) using data on U.S. local telephone markets in 2002.  Our results are 
consistent with the continued presence of both urban-to-rural and business-to-residential 
cross subsidy, although the inter-regional subsidy appears more pronounced.  In 
regressions that estimate the relationship between inter-regional price-cost margins and 
retail prices, results show that regulators set retail prices within customer classes 
similarly, but use revenues from urban business customers to lower rural retail prices.   
Wholesale (retail) prices are directly related to retail (wholesale) price-cost 
margins.  These results indicate that regulators take into account the “opportunity cost” 
associated with lost profits when competitors serve customers using incumbent facilities 
when setting wholesale prices.  The relatively small economic magnitude of the effects, 
however, is inconsistent with regulators overtly preserving historic pricing structures by 
increasing wholesale access prices.  Private-interests also appear to influence wholesale 
access prices, as increases in entrants’ political contributions lead to lower urban 
wholesale access prices, although the magnitude of the effect is small. 
While the analysis provides evidence that private interests continue to influence 
regulatory pricing decisions, the changes to the regulatory and market structure, as 
measured by federal approval of RBOC Section 271 applications, resulted in a re-
balancing of retail prices and lower overall price levels.  In addition, the political 
influence of rural constituents appears limited, as regulators use new federal high-cost 
universal service subsidies to lower urban business prices, rather than increasing urban-
rural cross-subsidies.  These results suggest that the Telecom Act, and introduction of 
  6competition, improved market performance and limited the ability of regulators to pursue 
private interest objectives. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes how U.S. local telephone 
markets are regulated.  Section III provides a brief theoretical illustration of the 
opportunity costs and trade offs facing state regulators.  Section IV outlines the empirical 
model and hypotheses about state regulator pricing behavior, and describes the data used 
to test our hypotheses.  Estimation results are discussed in Section V and Section VI 
provides conclusions. 
II.  REGULATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONE MARKETS 
U.S. regulation of local telephone markets requires coordination between federal and 
state commissions.  State regulators set prices and regulations for local services, while 
federal regulators are responsible for services that cross state lines.
9  Recognizing the bi-
jurisdictional nature of regulation, the Telecom Act required that the FCC (1996) set 
national guidelines state regulators were required to follow when implementing the Act.
10  
States were obligated to set wholesale prices based on the forward-looking economic cost 
of providing leased facilities, plus a reasonable contribution to joint and common costs 
and the incumbent’s profit.  Because the cost of providing service differs substantially by 
population density, the FCC required that states define at least three different pricing 
zones for unbundled network elements (UNEs), and set different wholesale prices for 
                                                 
9 The courts determined that facilities connecting consumers to the network carry both intrastate and 
interstate services, and determined that the FCC is responsible for regulating approximately 25 percent of 
the local network. For large carriers, the FCC uses price caps to regulate “interstate” charges, which include 
the fees long-distance companies pay local companies when a long-distance call originates or terminates on 
a local network (interstate access charges) and the flat-rated federal subscriber line charge (SLC).   
10 The FCC (1996) states that it “sets minimum uniform, national rules, but also relies heavily on state to 
apply these rules and to exercise their own discretion in implementing a pro-competitive regime in local 
telephone markets. On those issues where the need to create a factual record distinct to a state or to balance 
unique local considerations is material, we ask the states to develop their own rules that are consistent with 
the general guidance contained herein.”  (FCC 1996,  para. 22). 
  7each zone.  While the FCC’s rules limited the manner in which wholesale prices were set, 
state regulators had considerable discretion when setting wholesale prices.  State 
regulators were obliged to determine, among other things, the appropriate cost of capital, 
depreciation rate, cost of labor, and fill factors when estimating the economic cost of 
providing UNEs.  Each of these factors has a large impact on estimated costs.
11  
  In return for opening their markets to competition, the Telecom Act allows 
RBOCs to enter interstate long-distance markets, which had been prohibited since the 
1984 breakup of AT&T.
12  The Telecom Act’s Section 271 provides a 14-point checklist 
incumbent RBOCs must satisfy before they are allowed into interstate markets.  The 
checklist consists of specific market-opening actions, such as providing non-
discriminatory access to UNEs.  The approval process requires that RBOCs apply for 271 
approval on a state-by-state basis, and begins by receiving state-regulator certification 
that section 271’s checklist has been satisfied.  As part of the federal approval process, 
the Department of Justice (DoJ) reviews the RBOC’s application and consults the FCC.  
The DoJ, in an affidavit filed by Schwartz (1997), adopted an “Open Local Market” 
standard for authorizing RBOC entry into long-distance markets.  The standard requires 
that the local market in applicant RBOC’s state is “fully and irreversibly open to 
competition.”  The FCC approved the first 271 application, Verizon’s New York 
application, in December 1999, nearly four years after the Act’s passage.
13
                                                 
11 Gifford (2003) and Nuechterlein and Weiser (2005) discuss the leeway given to state regulators. 
12 The FCC found that “incumbent local exchange carriers have no economic incentive, independent of the 
incentives set forth in sections 271 and 274 of the 1996 Act, to provide potential competitors with 
opportunities to interconnect with and make use of the incumbent LEC’s network and services.” (FCC, 
1996, para. 55). 
13 As July 1, 2002, the FCC had approved 271 applications in Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Texas and Vermont. The FCC was in the process of reviewing applications from Alabama, 
Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hampshire and Delaware. Results where we 
  8  The Telecom Act requires that state and federal regulators reform universal 
service programs so they are compatible with a competitive environment.  Universal 
service programs must be explicit, and prices in high-cost areas should be reasonably 
comparable with prices in urban areas.  As part of its implementation of the Telecom Act, 
the FCC revised its high-cost subsidy program for large, non-rural carriers,
14 which 
includes the RBOCs, by targeting universal service subsidies to high-cost wire centers in 
states whose costs are well above the national average.  Using a cost-proxy model, the 
FCC estimated the forward-looking economic cost of local telephone service to identify 
high-cost areas and determine subsidies.
15  Telecom companies contribute a percentage 
of their interstate revenues to the Universal Service Administration Company (USAC) to 
fund the revised federal program.  USAC then distributes subsidies to companies, 
including entrants, providing service in targeted wire centers.
16   
Because state regulators have different preferences and constituencies, and costs 
differ across states, implementation of the Telecom Act may differ substantially across 
states and also within a state across different regions.  Political and profit constraints 
                                                                                                                                                 
include a variable for 271 applications under review yields largely similar results to those included in this 
study. RBOCs received 271 approval for all of their states by December 2003 (FCC, 2005b). 
14 A telephone company meets the FCC definition of a rural carrier if it meets any of the following criteria: 
serves only incorporated places with less than 10,000 inhabitants; has less than 50,000 access lines, has less 
than 100,000 access lines in any one state; or has less than 15 percent of its access lines in communities of 
more than 50,000 (FCC, 1996).   
15 Support is provided to “non-rural” carriers in states where cost-model estimated state-average cost is 
greater than 135 percent of the national average cost for large carriers. Federal non-rural USF support is 
distributed to Alabama, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Vermont and West Virginia. Montana and 
Wyoming also receive support, but are not included in our data. For the second quarter 2005, telecom 
companies paid 11.1 percent of interstate revenues into the USF. Total USF collections were $1,806 
million, of which $1,015 million went to high-cost support, $207 million went to low-income support, $577 
million to schools and libraries, and $6 million to rural health care (Universal Service Administrative 
Company, 2002). Most companies charge a universal service fee to their customers to recover their 
contribution to the USF. There are also transaction costs incurred by the FCC to calculate fund 
contributions and identify high-cost areas. 
16 See United States Court of Appeals (2005). In this ruling the 10
th Circuit upholds the mechanism the 
FCC adopted to induce states “to assist in implementing the goals of universal service. (pp. 31-2)” 
However, in this decision, the 10
th Circuit required that the FCC revisit several issues related with its non-
rural USF program, including the manner in which USF support is distributed to states. 
  9ensure that one particular group’s or region’s influence affects how regulators set prices 
for other groups and regions in the state.  The confluence of these factors means it is not 
clear whether state regulators behave in ways that promote local telephone competition 
and efficiency, or maintain the status quo.  Section III provides a theoretical illustration 
of the opportunity costs and trade offs facing state regulators.  The model gives insight 
into how prices for different groups are related and guides the empirical model and 
hypotheses in Section IV. 
III. THEORETICAL  DISCUSSION 
We extend Armstrong et al.’s (1996) access pricing model to include multiple consumer 
groups who influence regulators’ decisions.  A regulated incumbent local telephone 
company with an essential facility competes with a fringe of new entrants for consumer 
groups k = 1, …, K in regions m = 1, … , M.  Fringe firms are identical and produce a 
homogenous service within class k using the essential facility of the incumbent and other 
inputs.  All fringe firms are homogeneous and competition among them drives their retail 
price to cost.  The incumbent’s variable profit from serving group k in region m equals:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ()
ww
km km km m km km km km km m m km km km km m (P ,p (w )) P C Q P ,p (w ) w C q P ,p (w ) Π= − + −  (1) 
where Pkm is the incumbent’s retail price, pkm is the fringe’s retail price, wm is the 
wholesale price paid to access the essential facility,  and  are the incumbent’s 
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 is fringe demand for 
access, ckm(wm) is fringe constant marginal cost of providing retail service and qkm is 
fringe retail output. 
  10Interest groups influence the political environment so that regulators give 
preferential treatment to certain customers and regions through their pricing decisions.  
Consumer surplus for group k in m is represented by indirect utility  , 
and α
() km km km m VP , p ( w )
km are the weights regulators attach to consumer surplus.
17  As discussed by Ross 
(1984), αkm measures the political power group k in region m exerts on regulators, where 
a large αk indicates that group k can more easily convert a dollar of surplus into political 
support.  The regulator simultaneously chooses prices for each group and region to 
maximize: 
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Consider the case of two customer groups k = R, B, representing residential and 
business customers, respectively, and one region, m.  The first-order conditions (FOCs) 
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  11where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier, η’s are (absolute value) own-price elasticities of 
demand, sRm and sBm are shares of wholesale demand (i.e., sRm =  ) and 
.  The second terms in parentheses on the right-hand side of each price 
equation are marginal opportunity costs of retail and wholesale service provision, 
respectively.  This is the direct cost of providing service plus the opportunity cost of 
wholesale (retail) profit foregone when the incumbent sells one additional unit of its retail 
(wholesale) service (Willig, 1979; Baumol, 1983; Armstrong et al., 1996). 
w




mR mB qq q =+
Let (1 + λ) > αRm, αBm > 0 so that variable profit (i.e., revenue less marginal 
opportunity cost) for each group ranges from zero to the monopoly level.  The weights 
αRm = αBm = 1 correspond to standard Ramsey pricing rules whereby regulators choose 
λ/(1+ λ) so the price level covers fixed costs, and elasticities determine the optimal 
departure of prices from costs.  When residential consumer’s influence increases relative 
to business consumers so that αRm > 1 > αBm, the residential retail price mark up declines 
and the business retail price must increase to finance the profit constraint.  The 
relationship between regulatory preferences and the wholesale price is less clear.  Ideally, 
two wholesale prices, wRm and wBm, should be available to the regulator.  When 
residential consumers are preferred, the regulator decreases wRm to encourage entry in the 
residential market but increases wBm to protect the cross subsidy.  In practice, regulators 
have a single compromised access price, wm, that rises or falls with the relative strength 
of each group and the extent of cross subsidy.   
The discussion has several positive implications contrary to the intentions of the 
Telecom Act.  Given fixed costs and/or implicit cross subsidy, the regulator will set 
prices according to opportunity cost to support the historical pricing structure and prevent 
  12inefficient entry in the subsidizing market.  Empirically, a positive relationship between 
opportunity costs and retail and wholesale prices is consistent with this behavior.  To the 
extent that retail prices reflect regulator’s trade offs, the retail price-cost margin for a 
particular consumer group is a useful proxy for that group’s relative political influence.  
All things equal, an inverse relationship between the retail price-cost margin for one 
group and the retail price for others suggests the use of implicit cross subsidies.  The 
effect political power has on the wholesale price depends on the potential for entry in 
subsidizing and subsidized markets, respectively.  When most wholesale sales are in the 
subsidizing market, an increase in the relative political influence of the subsidized group 
will increase the wholesale price. 
IV.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
A.  Data 
To examine state regulator behavior, we gathered data on retail and wholesale access 
prices for the original RBOCs on July 1, 2002 for 7,661 wire centers in 43 states.
18  Price 
data are augmented with demographic and business-activity census data,
19 and the FCC’s 
(2000) Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (HCPM),
20 which provides total cost data and line 
counts for each wire center in the sample.  RBOCs account for about 80 percent of all 
U.S. local loops.
21  
                                                 
18 Alaska, Connecticut and Hawaii are excluded because they were not served by the original RBOCs. 
Wyoming and Montana are excluded because prices differ within wire centers. Idaho and Delaware are 
excluded because of insufficient cost data, and DC is excluded because it has only one UNE zone.   
19 United States Census Bureau (2002a, 2002b) 
20 The HCPM is based on engineering estimates of forward-looking economic costs assuming current wire 
center locations. These estimates are not the same as the historical or embedded costs that were incurred to 
build the network. Because we use cross-section data, the level of the cost is not as important as the relative 
costs across regions, and some of the criticisms of the HCPM should not affect our results. Marginal cost 
estimates were obtained from estimated total (loop and port) cost functions using HCPM data.  
21 This paper does not address pricing for small rural telephone companies, in part, because such companies 
were not generally subject to the same market opening and unbundling requirements as the RBOCs.  In 
  13Since most states have three UNE zones, generally representing urban, suburban 
and rural regions, we use that convention and define three regions in each state.  Urban 
UNE regions consist of wire centers with the lowest UNE prices in a state and rural 
regions include wire centers with the highest UNE prices.  Remaining wire centers are 
suburban.
22  Table 1 provides selected regional characteristics, prices and costs for 7,661 
wire centers located in each of the three regions.  1,345 wire centers are urban, 2,104 are 
suburban and 4,212 are rural.  Rural wire centers tend to include substantially more area 
than urban wire centers, but serve fewer customers.  The average rural wire center covers 
over 137 square miles, providing service to over 6,000 lines, while the average urban 
wire center covers approximately 55 square miles and contains over 36,000 lines.  The 
average urban wire center has over 4,800 lines per square mile, while rural wire centers 
average only 137 lines per square mile. 
Table 2 and Table 3 compare business and residential retail prices with marginal-
cost estimates for each of the three regions under consideration.  These data suggest that, 
nearly six years after the Act’s passage, state regulators continue the historical practice of 
using revenues from business customers to fund below-cost pricing for residential 
services.  The average monthly business retail price exceeds marginal cost by 
approximately $20, and is fairly constant across regions.  Nearly all business-line prices 
exceed estimated marginal cost.  For residential services, the average retail price is more 
than $4 below estimated marginal cost, with the largest shortfall, over $6, occurring in 
rural zones.  About 14 percent of all residential prices exceed estimated marginal cost.  
While this simple comparison is not a formal test of cross subsidy because we do include 
                                                                                                                                                 
addition, small telephone companies generally only provide service within a single zone so would be 
inapplicable to the study we are conducting.   
22 Chow tests reject the null hypothesis that the data-generating processes are the same across regions. 
  14data on revenues generated from additional services, such as caller ID, in-state long 
distance and other services, the data suggest that regulators favor residential customers.   
Pair-wise analysis of retail prices suggests relationships contrary to the a priori 
expectations of a negative relationship due to cross subsidy.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 plot 
business price-cost margins against residential price-cost margins for 1,345 urban and 
4,212 rural regions, respectively.  A simple linear regression shows that retail prices are 
positively related in both regions.  Figure 3 plots the average business price-cost margin 
in urban regions against the average residential price-cost margin in rural regions for the 
43 states in our data.  Again, we observe a positive (albeit smaller) relationship. 
Table 4 compares wholesale prices with marginal-cost estimates.  Overall, the 
average wholesale price for access to unbundled loops, including the loop port, 
approximately equals marginal cost.  In urban regions, the average wholesale price is 
nearly two dollars below marginal cost, while rural wholesale access prices exceed 
marginal cost by about three dollars.
23  While these data are inconsistent with regulators 
protecting historical pricing structures by setting wholesale prices above cost, no 
definitive conclusions are possible without considering other explanatory variables, 
unobservables, and the simultaneous setting of retail and wholesale prices. 
B.  Empirical Model 
Our empirical model is a semi-reduced form representation of the FOCs contained in 
equations (3) through (5).  The model sheds light on how state regulators balance 
economic and political forces when setting prices by including various proxies for public-
                                                 
23 The FCC allowed a mark-up for common costs. Because the average common cost is higher in rural 
areas, as shown by the difference between average and marginal costs in Table 2 through Table 4, the 
higher mark-ups in rural areas are consistent with FCC guidelines.  
  15interest, private-interest, and institutional factors. The baseline regressions estimate price 
equations for market i located in urban and rural regions, respectively, of the form: 
   (6)  Ri Ri R Ri R Ri R Ri Ri ln P = α +β cost + x z +ε + δγ
   (7)  Bi Bi B Bi B Bi B Bi Bi ln P = α +β cost + x z +ε + δγ
   (8) 
ww w w ww ww
ii i i ii ln w = α +β cost + x + z +ε δγ
where P is the monthly price for retail service, cost is a vector of marginal cost variables, 
x is a vector of interest-group, institutional and political affiliation variables 
characterizing the regulatory environment, z is a vector of demand variables, w is the 
monthly wholesale price for access to the incumbent’s network, α, β, δ and γ are 
parameters to be estimated and ε is an error.  Because the rural and urban regions provide 
the starkest contrast with respect to population density, political influence, and potential 
cross-subsidy, our regression analysis concentrates on these two regions.
24
C.  Variables and Hypotheses   
Dependent Variables: Retail prices were obtained from RBOC and state PUC websites.
25  
Retail prices for business and residential service are the sum of state-determined monthly 
charges for local service, federal subscriber line charge, primary inter-exchange carrier 
charge, and state charges for non-optional extended areas of service.
26  Wholesale access 
prices were obtained from Gregg (2002) and were cross-checked and supplemented with 
data from the applicable RBOC state-tariff filings and PUC web sites.  The wholesale 
                                                 
24 Suburban region results are available on request. 
25 See http://cpr.bst.bellsouth.com/index2.html, http://tariffs.uswest.com:8000/, 
http://www.sbc.com/search/tariffs.jsp and https://retailgateway.bdi.gte.com:1490/. 
26 Prices are for flat-rated service, which allows unlimited calling within the customer’s local calling area. 
In cases where states require measured service, where subscribers pay a monthly fee plus usage charges, 
estimates of monthly usage charges are included in the retail price. Retail price equations below include 
RESMEAS (BUSMEAS), which equals one when residential (business) customers are required to purchase 
measured service, and zero otherwise, to control for the effect of measured service on demand and pricing. 
  16access price equals sum of the UNE price for the loop and the rental price for the switch 
port (i.e., the interface between the switch and the loop). Telcordia (2000) data were used 
to match the retail and UNE prices with the appropriate wire center. 
Cost: The marginal cost (MC) of providing service in each wire center is obtained 
by estimating total (loop and port) cost functions with HCPM data.
27  Public-interest 
theory predicts a positive association between retail and wholesale prices and their direct 
marginal costs (hereafter, marginal costs).  Because the FCC’s (1996) pricing guidelines 
provide state regulators great flexibility setting wholesale prices, regulators may use 
wholesale prices to pursue private-interest objectives such as restricting entry to maintain 
the historical retail pricing structure.  A finding of no relationship between the wholesale 
price and marginal cost is consistent with private-interest arguments. 
The FCC (1996) explicitly rejected opportunity-cost based pricing (or, the 
efficient component pricing rule) because it would not force prices to competitive 
levels.
28  The theoretical discussion, however, permits the possibility that well-organized 
groups, such as the incumbent provider and residential customers, could influence 
regulators to include opportunity costs when setting wholesale prices to maintain the 
historical pricing structure or limit competition.  To account for the incumbent’s 
opportunity cost, we include both the residential (RPCM) and business (BPCM) retail 
price-cost margins in the wholesale price equation, and the wholesale price-cost margin 
(WPCM) in both retail price equations. These variables equal the difference between the 
price for the service and the estimated marginal cost in the wire center.  An insignificant 
                                                 
27 Cost function estimates are available from the authors on request. 
28 The FCC concludes that “the ECPR [efficient component pricing rule] does not provide any mechanism 
for moving prices toward competitive levels; it simply takes prices as given.  … Congress specifically 
determined that input prices should be based on cost because this would foster competition in the retail 
market.”  (FCC 1996  para. 709 and 710).  
  17relationship between opportunity costs and prices is consistent with regulatory behavior 
that follows closely the Telecom Act’s intentions.  Large positive coefficients on any of 
these price-cost margins indicate that private-interest groups may influence regulators’ 
pricing decisions. 
Political Influence (x): Theoretically, an increase in one group’s political power 
lowers the favored group’s price, at the expense of higher prices for less powerful groups 
(or lower incumbent profit).  Traditionally, researchers use group size to measure the 
demand for favorable regulation.  In price regressions, however, the effect an increase in 
an influential group’s size exerts on prices is unclear.  Consider the case where business 
customers subsidize residential customers.  An increase in the number of residential 
customers may be correlated with an increase in residential customer’s political influence 
and larger subsidies.  Alternatively, holding the per-line subsidy constant, an increase in 
the number of residential customers requires more money be transferred from businesses 
to residential customers to provide the same per line subsidy.  In this second case, where 
political influence is held constant, an increase in the number of residential customers 
may lead regulators to reduce per-line subsidies (but maintain or increase the total 
subsidy dollars), increasing both residential and business prices.
29  Both cases predict that 
business prices are positively related to the number of residential customers, but there is 
no clear prediction for residential prices. 
We employ two proxies to capture the size of potentially powerful groups.  To 
measure the number of residential customers relative to business customers, we include 
POP-EMP, which equals the ratio of residential population to number of service 
                                                 
29 The latter effect is consistent with the private interest theory prediction that regulators “share the pain” 
when costs increase (Peltzman, 1976; Kaserman et al., 1990). 
  18employees in all equations.  We also include the percentage a state’s population living in 
rural areas (RUR POP)
30 in all price equations for all regions.   
Including regulators’ preferences in the theoretical discussion shows that retail 
prices can be inversely related, a result that does not arise in the standard public-interest 
model.  In the price equations, we use particular group’s, or region’s, retail price-cost 
margin as a proxy for that group’s ability to organize its political support into favorable 
pricing outcomes regardless of group size.
31  Because we control for interest-group size 
explicitly, estimates of the effect particular group’s price-cost margins exert on the prices 
of other groups and regions provides information on the particular group’s political 
power.  Importantly, such estimates capture only political-influence effects (i.e., the 
group’s ability to organize and convert consumer surplus into political support) and are 
not confounded by the impact increased group size has on the ability of regulators to 
generate subsidy dollars.  An inverse relationship between one group’s retail price-cost 
margin and another group’s retail price suggests regulators use implicit cross subsidies to 
favor private-interest groups.   
To measure the extent of intra-region political influence, we include the business 
(residential) price-cost margin, BPCM (RPCM), in the residential (business) price 
equation for the same wire center.  To examine the extent of inter-region implicit cross 
subsidy, we include the average residential price-cost margin in a state’s rural regions 
                                                 
30 RUR POP equals the percentage of households located in rural areas, as defined by the census, in the 
area served by the state’s RBOC. 
31 Political influence is declining in the price-cost margin. A finding that regulators, holding demand and 
marginal cost constant, trade off higher mark-ups to one group to lower other retail prices suggests that 
regulators act in their private interest, responding to the influence of politically powerful groups. Under a 
standard Ramsey pricing scheme, holding demand and marginal cost constant, prices are set above cost to 
recover fixed costs. An increase in fixed costs results in an increase in all prices.   
  19(RUR RPCM) in urban price equations and the urban business price-cost margin (URB 
BPCM) in rural price equations.   
Incumbents and new entrants have vested interests in the outcomes of state 
regulatory proceedings that affect wholesale access prices and may attempt to influence 
outcomes by contributing to state politicians.  To capture the effect relative political 
contributions exert on wholesale prices, we include CONTRIB, which equals the ratio of 
dollars contributed to state politicians by donors affiliated with competitors to 
contributions made by donors affiliated with a state’s RBOC for the 2000 election 
cycle.
32  Private-interest theory predicts a negative relationship between relative 
contributions and wholesale access price, especially in lucrative urban markets. 
Institutions and Political Affiliation (x): We examine the relationship between 
institutional factors, stemming both from the Telecom Act and a state’s regulatory 
environment.  To investigate how changes to the federal universal service program 
affected local prices, we construct USF, the monthly per-line federal subsidy targeted to a 
wire center in the second quarter 2002.  Because only five urban wire centers attract high-
cost support, and the support is small (averaging $0.86 per subsidized line), we include 
USF in only the rural retail price equations where 512 wire centers are subsidized.
33  To 
the extent that USF ensures rural retail prices are comparable with urban prices, we 
expect a negative coefficient for USF in rural retail price regressions.  This conclusion, 
                                                 
32 Data are obtained from The Institute on Money in State Politics at www.followthemoney.org. Non-
incumbent RBOC wireless carriers are included as competitors. We divided the contributions between 
RBOC and competitors and were able to categorize more than 99 percent of contributions.   
33 Data on subsidies distributed by the high-cost program of the federal USF were obtained from the USAC. 
The federal USF provides support to 677 of the 7,661 wire centers in our data: five are urban; 160 are 
suburban; and 512 are rural. 
  20however, requires that rural prices would reflect costs in the absence of an explicit 
subsidy.   
The private-interest theory of regulation assumes that regulators view USF as a 
revenue source available for allocation across constituencies.  Under this view, a negative 
coefficient on USF in rural retail price regressions may indicate that regulators use USF 
to increase rural cross-subsidies.  In the presence of rural cross subsidies, public-interest 
theory implies that regulators may use USF dollars to relieve urban customers’ subsidy 
burden by moving urban retail prices closer to cost.  To test these distinctions, we 
construct RUR USF, which equals the average per-line subsidy in a state’s rural areas, 
and include this variable in urban price regressions.  The signs of the estimated 
coefficients on USF and RUR USF provide insight into the extent rural constituents 
influence regulatory behavior.   
We also include S271 (equals one if the RBOC received Section 271 approval by 
July 1, 2002 in a state and zero otherwise) in all equations to capture the effect lowered 
entry barriers and increased competition along with RBOC entry in interstate long-
distance markets exert on retail and wholesale access prices.  If regulators historically 
used business revenues to hold residential retail prices below competitive levels, 
increased entry and competition may lead to a rebalancing of retail prices.  Such a finding 
is consistent with regulators adhering to public-interest standards, requiring that RBOCs 
open local markets to competition before approving 271 applications.  A second 
possibility is that the removal of line-of-business restrictions loosens the incumbent’s 
profit constraint, allowing regulators to decrease all prices, including wholesale access 
prices.  Both of these findings are consistent with public-interest behavior. 
  21Although not the main focus of this study, it is important to control for other 
aspects of the state’s regulatory environment.  Accordingly, we include REP GOV (which 
equals one when the state’s governor is a Republican and zero otherwise), REP PUC 
(equals one when the majority of state’s PUC commissioners are Republican and zero 
otherwise), ELECT (equals one when PUC commissioners are elected by the general 
population and zero otherwise) and PRICECAP (equals one if the PUC used price caps to 
regulate local prices in 2000 and zero otherwise) in all price equations.
34
Demand (z): Measures of demand reflect the absolute size of markets and the size 
of particular customer groups within a market.  In most cases, these variables are not 
helpful in distinguishing between different economic theories, and are best interpreted as 
controls.  To control for demand in the residential price equation, we include the 
percentage of a wire-center’s population over 60 years of age (AGE), the percentage of 
white households (WHITE), and the percentage of residents under the poverty level 
(POVERTY).  We also include the number of households in the customer’s free local 
calling area (LCA).  In the business equations we include, the number of employees in the 
wire center (EMPLOY), the percentage of service employees (SERVICE), and the 
percentage of establishments with less than 20 employees (SMALL FIRMS).
35  EMPLOY 
and LCA are included in the access-price equation.  Additionally, we include the 
percentage of a state’s lines in the appropriate region (PTLINES) in the access-price 
equation, to capture the importance of access prices on the incumbent’s budget constraint.  
                                                 
34 Data were obtained from the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (2002), National 
Center for Appropriate Technology (2005), U.S. Census Bureau (2002c) and from David Sappington.  
35 SMALL FIRMS are the primary customers of business service we examine in this study.  Demographic 
data for each wire center were obtained by matching census block group data from the 2000 decennial 
census to wire centers using Claritas (2003). The data also include information on business conditions, 
obtained from the Census’s 2000 County Business Patterns, for the county in which the majority of a wire 
center is located. 
  22As discussed above regulators may have the incentive to set higher wholesale access 
prices the larger the share of lines represented by a region.
36
V. ESTIMATION  RESULTS 
A.  Estimation Strategy 
Theory suggests state regulators consider all retail and wholesale prices when setting 
prices, so any price-cost margin used as an explanatory variable is endogenous.  S271 is 
likely endogenous because state regulators, in consultation with the FCC and the DoJ, 
evaluate incumbents’ 271 applications and also make pricing decisions.  Both decisions 
may be correlated with unobserved factors.  While Hausman (1978) statistics provide 
mixed results concerning the endogeneity of S271 in price equations, we proceed 
cautiously and treat S271 as endogenous.  Since PRICECAP is constructed from 2000 
data, we treat it exogenous.   
Initial baseline regressions of price equations contain three endogenous variables: 
the two intra-region price-cost margins and S271.  As indicated by price equations (6) 
through (8), the exogenous demand (z) variables differ across all equations, ensuring 
there are sufficient excluded instruments to identify the coefficients on price-cost 
margins.  The coefficients on S271 in all price equations are identified by a set of 
regional averages that reflect underlying cost and demand conditions in the urban and 
non-urban portions of the state.
37  These additional excluded exogenous variables are 
urban and non-urban averages for DENSITY (number of lines per square mile), EMPLOY, 
                                                 
36 Table 5 and Table 6 report summary statistics for all variables in urban and rural price equations. 
37 The data confirm it is important to capture differences in cost and demand conditions between urban and 
non-urban areas of a state when choosing excluded exogenous variables for first-stage estimates. Hansen 
(1982) J-statistics rejected the null of zero correlation between instruments and errors in alternative 
specifications that used state averages on DENSITY, EMPLOY, LCA, and POP-EMP as excluded 
exogenous variables. 
  23LCA, and POP-EMP.  We also include DEREG (equals one if the state deregulated its 
electric power industry before 2002, and zero otherwise) as an excluded exogenous 
variable, which measures a state’s willingness to adopt market-oriented solutions for 
previously regulated industries without directly affecting telephone prices.    
Subsequent price equations are augmented with an inter-region price-cost margin, 
which is also endogenous.  Coefficients on inter-region price-cost margins are identified 
using the same instruments described above, as well as additional demand variables for 
urban or rural regions.  When the inter-region price-cost margin is the average rural 
resident price-cost margin (RUR RPCM), the additional excluded instruments are average 
values for AGE, POVERTY and WHITE in rural regions.  When the inter-region price-
cost margin is the average urban business price-cost margin (URB BPCM), the additional 
excluded instruments are averages for SERVICE and SMALL FIRMS in urban regions. 
Pagan-Hall test statistics from two-stage least squares results indicate that 
heteroskedasticity is present throughout all price equations.  As such, Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) is used to obtain robust estimates with heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form.  Because state regulators set prices throughout the state, observations on 
wire centers drawn from the same state are likely to be correlated, while observations on 
wire centers in different states are not.  Following Baum (2003), we use weighting 
matrices that allow for intra-state clustering among wire centers. 
B.  Results 
Table 7 and Table 8 provide residential, business and wholesale price equation estimates 
for rural and urban regions, respectively.  The first column for each price equation 
includes intra-region price-cost margins only.  The second column adds inter-region 
  24variables as additional regressors.  The data suggest that RUR RPCM and RUR USF are 
significant determinants of urban prices and URB BPCM is an important determinant of 
rural prices. Moreover, several of the estimated coefficients of interest in urban price 
equations are sensitive to the omission of these inter-region variables.  The discussion 
below focuses primarily on our preferred specification with inter-region variables, found 
in columns two, four, and six of Table 7 and Table 8.
38  
The results suggest that prices correspond reasonably well with costs across 
consumer groups and regions.  In both urban and rural regions, the estimated (direct) 
marginal cost (MC) of providing service has a significant positive effect on retail and 
wholesale prices.  When considered with evidence from summary statistics in Table 4, 
where average UNE prices reflect estimated average costs, these results suggest that state 
regulators are complying with the spirit of the FCC (1996) order of cost-based wholesale 
pricing.  Marginal cost effects have relatively small economic significance in urban 
regions.  A one-dollar increase in MC increases urban residential, business, and 
wholesale prices by 6.8, 12.2, and 13 cents, respectively, when evaluated at the average 
price.
39  In contrast, a one-dollar increase in MC increases the corresponding rural prices 
by 21, 44.6, and 77.1 cents, respectively.  Regulators appear to be more responsive to 
changes in the cost of providing rural service and pass on cost changes directly to rural 
consumers.   
                                                 
38 Intercepts vary across regions served by different RBOCs. Partial R
2 statistics by Bound et al. (1995) and 
Shea (1997) suggest the excluded instruments have good explanatory power in first-stage regressions. In 
almost all cases, Hansen (1982) J statistics do not reject the null of zero correlation between instruments 
and errors. 
39 Unless stated otherwise, all economic effects are calculated using the arithmetic average for the variables 
of interest, as reported in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. 
  25In addition to MC, theory predicts that regulators may account for the opportunity 
cost of providing retail (wholesale) services when setting wholesale (retail) prices.  
Results show that opportunity costs exert a significant positive effect on urban wholesale 
prices, and that the magnitudes are reasonably comparable to the effects direct marginal 
cost have on wholesale prices.  A one-dollar increase in the urban business (residential) 
price-cost margin increases urban wholesale prices by 8.9 (13.5) cents.  Opportunity costs 
exert a positive, albeit marginally significant, effect on rural wholesale prices.  Here, a 
one-dollar increase in the rural business price-cost margin increases rural UNE prices by 
13.5 cents.  In both urban retail price equations, estimated coefficients on the wholesale 
access price-cost margin (WPCM) are positive.  The impact of opportunity cost is largest 
in the business price-equation.  A one-dollar increase in WPCM increases residential and 
business prices by 12.6 and 57.6 cents, respectively. 
In summary, estimated cost coefficients show that state regulators consider both 
direct and opportunity costs when setting prices.  While the former result is encouraging, 
the relatively small size of the impact of direct cost on urban prices implies that prices are 
not set purely on public-interest criteria.  It also appears that state regulators set 
wholesale prices that consider opportunity costs, albeit with a small effect.  Moreover, the 
impact of opportunity cost on urban prices is comparable to the impact of direct marginal 
cost.  This suggests that incumbents and residential customers may only be able to 
influence regulators to use opportunity-cost pricing to maintain a small part of the 
historical pricing structure. 
We now consider how the sizes of consumer groups, i.e. urban and rural, and 
residential and business customers, affect regulator behavior.  The estimated coefficients 
  26on RUR POP are positive for retail price equations in both regions.  Results indicate that 
a 10 percent increase in a state’s rural population increases urban (rural) residential prices 
by 1.11 (0.85) percent, or approximately 16 (20.1) cents.  The effects on business prices, 
while smaller in percentage terms; urban (rural) business prices increase by 0.87 (0.29) 
percent, have similar effects on prices.  Urban (rural) business prices increase by about 
31.1 (10.3) cents.  
The relative size of residential to business consumers (POP-EMP) has no impact 
on residential prices but a positive effect on business prices.  All things equal, this 
suggests that residential customers can use their group size in a way that results in 
business customers bearing a greater cost burden.  A ten percent increase in population 
relative to employment results in a 2.8 percent, or $1.09, increase in the business price.  
The results on relative size are consistent with private-interests influencing state 
regulators; regulators increase non-member prices (urban and business) when favored 
groups (rural and residential) increase in size. 
Both RUR POP and POP-EMP measure group size effects.  Consumer groups 
with more members provide more potential votes.  However, some groups, regardless of 
size, may be relatively more effective in converting surplus into political support.  
Controlling for group size, we use retail price-cost margins as proxies for the 
effectiveness of political influence.  A negative coefficient on the retail price-cost margin 
measures the extent to which interest groups obtain favorable outcomes by using their 
persuasive powers and/or ability to organize political support. 
For purpose of comparison, consider the initial baseline regressions that include 
intra-region price-cost margins only.  In the urban residential price-equation, column one 
  27of Table 7, the estimated coefficient on the intra-region business price-cost margin 
(BPCM) is -0.0042 and highly significant.  A similar result is found in the retail business 
equation, located in column 3 of Table 7, where RPCM receives a coefficient of -0.0037 
and is significant at the ten percent level.  The signs of these estimated coefficients 
suggest regulators trade off residential and business customers within urban regions.  No 
evidence of intra-regional trade-offs is found in the rural equations.  In fact, results show 
that residential and business prices have a positive correspondence within rural regions.  
It appears that regulators tend to set both rural retail prices similarly rather than trade off 
residential and business customers. 
When inter-region variables are considered in the preferred specification, 
evidence of a business-residential trade off within urban regions is weaker.  Estimates of 
the urban-residential price equation, reported in the second column of Table 7, show the 
coefficient on BPCM has decreased to -0.0002 and is not significant.  The coefficient on 
RPCM in the urban-business price equation, reported in the fourth column of Table 7, has 
also decreased to -0.0029 and is marginally significant.  The results show, however, a 
significant inverse relationship between urban business prices and rural residential prices, 
which is consistent with urban-to-rural cross subsidization across customer services.  
Estimates in column 4 of table 7 show that a dollar increase in the RUR RPCM lowers 
urban business prices by 67.3 cents.  Given there are about 0.95 rural residential lines for 
each urban business line, slightly more than half of any increase in rural residential net 
revenues is used to lower urban business prices.  For rural residential prices (column 2 of 
Table 8), the results predict that a one-dollar increase in the average urban business price-
  28cost margin leads to a 19.1 cent decline in rural residential prices.
40  Inter-region trade-
offs are not directly apparent in wholesale prices for either urban or rural regions. 
Interestingly, columns 2 and 4 of Tables 7 and 8, respectively, show that rural 
residential price-cost margins (RUR RPCM) are positively related to urban residential 
prices, and urban business price-costs margin (URB BPCM) are positively related to rural 
business prices.  Regulators tend to set all residential (or, business) prices similarly rather 
than trade off urban to rural regions within a specific class of customer service. 
At this point, our estimation results suggest that aggregated studies that rely on 
state-average prices and/or ignore rural areas, do not properly capture the political 
process followed by regulators, and potentially misinterpret the trade offs they face.  
Nearly six years after the Telecom Act’s passage, the data provide reasonable evidence 
that private-interest concerns, as measured by the price-cost margin facing rural (urban) 
residential (business) customers, continue to play a role in the explanation of regulator’s 
retail pricing behavior. 
We now explore how the political actions of incumbent and new entrants affect 
regulated wholesale prices.  The interpretation of the negative coefficient on political 
contributions (CONTRIB) in the urban-wholesale price-equation is clear.  Increased 
contributions by the incumbent relative to new and potential entrants increases the 
wholesale price in lucrative urban regions.  However, the economic significance of this 
result is small.  For instance, if the incumbent doubled its average contribution relative to 
                                                 
40 Because part of the increase in net revenue from increasing urban business prices may also be used to 
lower suburban prices, this accounts for about one-half of the increase in net revenue. 
  29its competitors, the urban wholesale price would increase by 8.6 cents.
41  Political 
contributions have no effect on rural wholesale prices.
42
We find no evidence that state regulators further rural interests by using federal 
USF subsidies to exacerbate rural cross-subsidies.  Wire-center-specific USF (USF) has 
no effect on rural retail prices.
43  By contrast, an increase in the federal universal service 
funding to rural regions (RUR USF) is associated with lower urban business prices.  The 
estimated coefficient on RUR USF of -0.0126 is similar to the coefficient on RUR RPCM 
(-0.0172), indicating that a dollar per line in additional targeted federal universal service 
funding reduces urban business prices by about forty-seven cents.  The similarity in 
magnitude of coefficients on RUR USF and RUR RPCM suggests that regulators view the 
contribution of an additional dollar from different sources similarly, using them to reduce 
urban business prices.  This finding may also help explain the finding by Kaserman et. al. 
(1990) who find that explicit subsidy dollars do not lower residential prices.
44  Instead of 
providing rural price relief, regulators transfer the money to urban businesses, lowering 
the subsidy burden borne by urban businesses.
45   
                                                 
41 Incumbent’s contributions may have greater influence in states with relatively large rural populations.  
When the interests of the incumbent and subsidized rural customers coincide, regulators face more political 
pressure, and may raise wholesale prices by a greater amount to increase entry barriers and protect the 
historical pricing structure. We test this hypothesis in other regressions, not reported, and find the effect of 
incumbent contributions on wholesale prices increases with rural population. The coefficient on the 
interaction term CONTRIB×RUR POP is -0.091 and significant at the five percent level. 
42 In other regressions, not reported, we include CONTRIB in both urban and rural retail equations. 
CONTRIB had no relationship with retail prices. 
43 In other specifications, not reported, USF and average urban USF were included in the urban and rural 
price equations, respectively, were insignificant and had no appreciable impact on the other coefficients. 
44 Eriksson et al. (1998) and Ackerberg et al. (2005) discuss targeted subsidy schemes in the context of low-
income support and find that those also have a positive effect on telephone subscriptions. Goolsbee and 
Guryan (2005) show that the E-rate subsidy, initiated from the Telecom Act and financed by the federal 
USF, significantly increased Internet access in California public schools. 
45 Our analysis focuses on RBOCs, which have substantial urban and rural service territories. State 
regulators may not be able to effectuate such transfers within smaller rural telephone companies that do not 
serve urban business customers. It is possible that USF subsidies may affect local telephone penetration 
through non-price channels, such as quality improvements.
  30Urban residential prices are higher and urban business prices lower in states 
where the incumbent has had its Section 271 application approved.  The change in 
relative prices is substantial.  Urban business prices are 18.2 percent lower in states with 
271 approval and urban-residential prices are 4.5 percent higher.
46  This corresponds to a 
$7.22 decrease in the business price and an $0.86 increase in the residential price.  Some 
of the change may be due to rebalancing of prices in the face of competition as in Knittel 
(2004).  In addition, it appears the regulators take advantage of the additional revenue 
stream to reduce prices overall.  There are about 1.4 urban residential lines for each urban 
business line, and the revenues lost from the 18.2 percent reduction in business prices 
outweigh the 4.5 percent increase in residential prices.  Somewhat surprisingly, results 
also indicate that 271 approval leads to substantially lower business and wholesale prices 
in rural areas.  This result runs contrary to the widely held belief that competition is 
concentrated in urban areas.  Rural business and wholesale prices are $4.44 and $11.69 
lower, respectively, in states with 271 approval. 
Although not the main focus of this study, some discussion of the relationship 
between regulatory environment variables and prices is warranted.  Republican governors 
and Republican PUCs have different effects – Republican governors tend to reduce the 
urban retail prices and Republican PUCs increase all retail (urban and rural) prices.  In 
contrast, Republican governors have no impact on UNE prices and Republican PUCs 
lead to lower urban UNE prices.  The Republican PUC effect may come from more cost-
based retail prices and less pressure to set above-cost UNE prices simply to protect 
sources of implicit subsidy.  The election of PUC Commissioners leads to higher prices.  
                                                 
46 Knittle (2004) shows that increased local competition in seventy cities from 1988 to 1995 resulted in a 
2.5 percent decrease in business prices and a 3.6 percent increase in residential prices. 
  31This may be due to the political influence of the incumbents in the election process.  
States with price caps in place in 2000 tend to have higher retail prices in 2002.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
State regulators responded to the Telecom Act by setting new wholesale prices and 
adjusting local retail prices.  We examine the extent to which these prices were in the 
public interest or were influenced by private-interest groups.  Using data on RBOC retail 
and wholesale access prices empirical results indicate that private interests continue to 
influence the structure of retail and wholesale prices, although their influence appears to 
be waning.  We find that changes to the regulatory structure, as measured by federal 
approval of RBOC Section 271 applications and universal service subsidies, resulted in a 
re-balancing of retail prices and lower overall price levels.   
While both retail and wholesale prices are positively related to estimated marginal 
costs, the magnitude of the relationship is small.  As suggested by theory, results also 
show that wholesale prices are positively related to opportunity costs, measured by 
business and residential retail price-cost margins.  However, the relatively small 
economic magnitude of the effects is inconsistent with regulators overtly preserving 
historic pricing structures by increasing wholesale access prices.   
In contrast to other studies that rely solely on the size of potentially powerful 
groups to measure political influence, we also include group and region price-cost 
margins as direct measures of a group’s ability to secure favorable outcomes.  While 
results indicate that increases in the relative size of residential and rural customers lead to 
higher business and urban prices, neither measure indicates that these groups use their 
size to secure lower prices.  Results on price-cost margins, however, are consistent with 
  32the presence of business-to-residential and urban-to-rural cross subsidies.  While the 
results are consistent with a small amount of intra-region cross subsidy, inter-regional 
cross subsidies, as demonstrated by the negative correlation between rural residential 
(urban-business) price-cost margins and urban business (rural-residential) retail prices, 
are more prominent.   
Because of the political process, regulators set retail prices within customer 
classes similarly, but use revenues from urban business customers to lower retail prices in 
rural regions.  The political influence of rural constituents, however, appears limited, as 
regulators use new federal high-cost universal service subsidies to lower urban business 
prices, rather than increasing urban-rural cross-subsidies.  The analysis finds that private-
interests influence wholesale access prices as well, as increases in entrants’ political 
contributions, relative to incumbents, lead to lower urban wholesale access prices, 
although the magnitude of the effect is small. 
Our results provide evidence that private-interest concerns continue to play a role 
in the explanation of regulator’s retail pricing behavior, but we also find that increased 
competition reduced the impact private-interests exert on regulatory behavior.  In 
exchange for opening their markets to competition, the Telecom Act allows RBOCs to 
enter interstate long-distance markets, provided regulators are satisfied that their markets 
are open to competition.  Retail business prices are lower, and residential prices higher in 
states where the RBOC’s Section 271 application was approved.  Moreover, overall price 
levels are lower in such states.  While Section 271 approval is an indirect measure of the 
Telecom Act’s impact on market structure, results concerning Section 271 suggest that 
increased competition has improved economic efficiency and has conferred benefits to 
  33consumers in the form of lower prices.  Despite claims that it is a failure, evidence 
presented in this paper indicates that the Telecom Act’s market-opening provisions 
mitigate the influence private interests exert on the structure of regulated prices. 
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TABLE 1 












2) 107.27  55.57  80.64  137.08 
 (166.63)  (89.29)  (103.06)  (201.40) 
Telephone Lines per mile
2 1,310 4,804 1,426 137.5 
 (9,628)  (22,290)  (3,038)  (397.2) 
Households in local calling area (100,000’s)  1.75  4.39  2.22  0.67 
  (2.81) (3.83) (2.87) (1.45) 
Percentage of households in poverty   0.12  0.13  0.11  0.12 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Total  employment  (100,000’s)  2.22 5.45 2.80 0.90 
  (4.95) (7.99) (4.52) (2.96) 
% of establishments with < 20 employees  0.87  0.85  0.86  0.88 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Total  lines at 2000  16,677  36,665  24,487  6,393 
  (22,904) (29,240) (24,644) (10,687) 
USF contribution ($) per line (2
nd Quarter 2002)  0.81  0.003  0.46  1.24 
  (4.46) (0.10) (2.56) (5.70) 
Number  of  observations  7,661 1,345 2,104 4,212 














Retail Price (PB)  B 35.65  35.83  35.70  35.06 
 (8.88)  (10.04)  (8.11)  (6.96) 
Estimated Marginal Cost (MCB)  B 15.23  15.10  15.29  15.46 
 (2.02)  (1.81)  (1.89)  (2.71) 
PB – MC B B
B   20.42  20.73  20.41  19.59 
 (9.03)  (10.25)  (8.06)  (7.38) 
Wholesale UNE (Loop & Port) Price (w)  14.89  12.77  15.31  19.66 
 (4.77)  (3.03)  (3.69)  (6.65) 
PB – w  B 20.76  23.06  20.39  15.40 
 (8.46)  (8.48)  (7.40)  (8.07) 
Estimated Average Cost  19.90  18.09  19.85  24.86 
 (5.53)  (3.27)  (4.17)  (8.95) 
% Lines PB > MC B B
B   99.94% 100%  100%  99.65% 
% Lines PB > w  B 99.79% 100%  99.92%  98.93% 
Percentage of Lines  100%  46.44%  37.25%  16.3% 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Summary statistics weighted by appropriate number of lines. 
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TABLE 3 










Retail Price (PR) 18.77 18.51  19.01  18.70 
 (3.39) (3.00) (3.61)  (3.48) 
Estimated Marginal Cost (MCR) 23.10 22.45  22.61  24.93 
 (2.75) (2.07) (2.49)  (3.22) 
PR – MCR   -4.33  -3.94 -3.59  -6.23 
 (4.40) (3.24) (4.60)  (4.95) 
Wholesale UNE (Loop & Port) Price (w)  16.25 13.37  15.81  21.33 
 (6.12) (3.18) (4.31)  (8.57) 
PR – w  2.51  5.14  3.20  -2.63 
 (6.49) (3.03) (5.25)  (8.93) 
Estimated Average Cost  23.00 19.75  21.10  31.23 
 (11.33) (4.19) (6.07)  (19.15) 
% Lines PR > MCR   13.58%10.09% 18.95%  7.73% 
% Lines PR > w  75.79%93.92% 74.06%  51.78% 
Percentage of Lines  100% 35.99% 39.97%  24.04% 




SUMMARY OF UNE PRICE, COSTS AND LINES 2002 









Wholesale UNE (Loop & Port) Price (w)  15.77  13.12  15.65  20.86 
 (5.72)  (3.13)  (4.13)  (8.11) 
Estimated Marginal Cost (MC
w) 15.92  15.06  15.90  17.53 
 (2.14)  (2.12)  (1.76)  (1.88) 
Estimated Average Cost  20.18  17.51  19.12  27.08 
 (8.62)  (3.66)  (5.05)  (14.71) 
w - MC
w   -0.15  -1.94  -0.25  3.33 
 (4.93)  (2.98)  (3.68)  (7.43) 
% Lines w > MC
w 40.29% 21.81% 43.32%  68.32% 
Percentage of Lines (total)  100%  39.54%  38.99%  21.46% 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses. Summary statistics weighted by appropriate number of lines. 
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FIGURE 3 
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Note:  Because we use state averages, there are 43 observations.  
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TABLE 5 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR URBAN PRICE EQUATIONS 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
PR 18.9999 2.8522  12.1830 26.8000 
MCR 23.4298 2.0185  17.1233 41.2015 
WPCM  -2.4010 2.6584  -9.4898  7.8809 
BPCM  24.9648 10.1166 4.2504  45.3384 
RUR RPCM  -8.7795 3.2328  -25.1415  1.5273 
RUR POP  0.1818 0.1054  0.0382  0.5994 
POP-EMP  2.8272 0.4068  0.7832  3.4378 
S271  0.3197 0.4665  0.0000  1.0000 
RUR USF  0.6384 2.8566  0.0000 22.4286 
REP GOV  0.4498 0.4977  0.0000  1.0000 
REP PUC  0.5123 0.5000  0.0000  1.0000 
ELECT  0.2342 0.4237  0.0000  1.0000 
PRICECAP  0.8989 0.3016  0.0000  1.0000 
LCA  4.3962 3.8310  0.0129 18.1023 
AGE  0.1530 0.0504  0.0000  0.5468 
WHITE  0.7296 0.2325  0.0000  1.0000 
POVERTY  0.1264 0.0833  0.0000  0.6225 
RESMEAS  0.0245 0.1548  0.0000  1.0000 
PB 39.5888 9.8641  23.4829 58.6400 
MCB 14.6240 1.6513  11.8535 32.1696 
RPCM  -4.4299 3.0828  -21.1215  7.2419 
EMPLOY  5.4512 7.9884  0.0066 38.6387 
SERVICE  0.7815 0.0870  0.3904  0.9663 
SMALL FIRMS  0.8468 0.0254  0.7823  0.9596 
BUSMEAS  0.2810 0.4497  0.0000  1.0000 
w  13.9383 2.8228  7.6000 20.5700 
MC
W 16.3393 1.7956  3.4239 24.6998 
CONTRIB  0.9185 2.5385  0.0000 61.0000 
PTLINES  0.5856 0.2006  0.0343  0.9210 














  42TABLE 6 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR RURAL PRICE EQUATIONS 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
PR 18.8493 3.3167  12.6900 29.3900 
MCR 25.7041 3.4685  20.4924  105.9991 
WPCM  6.6772 10.8727  -22.7517  62.3738 
BPCM  22.2403 8.3533  -58.6328 49.0423 
URB BPCM  23.2493 8.3634  8.0065 43.3947 
POP-EMP  4.8808 1.3157  3.0010  8.4414 
USF  1.2419 5.7026  0.0000 78.3800 
LCA  0.6744 1.4538  0.0008 14.6626 
AGE  0.1857 0.0566  0.0011  0.7851 
WHITE  0.8997 0.1398  0.0198  1.0000 
POVERTY  0.1206 0.0710  0.0000  0.5438 
RESMEAS  0.0802 0.2717  0.0000  1.0000 
PB 37.1564 7.5930  21.8300 63.0000 
MCB 14.9161 3.1003  12.5799 86.5228 
RPCM  -6.8548 4.9323  -89.8791  8.2785 
EMPLOY  0.8975 2.9611  0.0003 38.6387 
SERVICE  0.7100 0.1162  0.0691  0.9789 
SMALL FIRMS  0.8824 0.0311  0.7349  1.0000 
BUSMEAS  0.4190 0.4935  0.0000  1.0000 
w  25.0806 11.3665  11.6500  80.3900 
MC
W 18.4034 1.7167  12.5450 56.8243 
PTLINES  0.3484 0.2512  0.0343  0.9210 

















  43TABLE 7 
GMM ESTIMATES OF URBAN PRICE EQUATIONS 






  (0.37) (2.01) (0.06) (2.02)  (1.44)  (1.75) 




***   
  (2.03) (2.42) (2.88) (3.56)     
BCPM      -0.0042
*** -0.0002     0.0050
** 0.0064
**
  (4.08) (0.12)      (2.52)  (2.30) 




     (1.78)  (1.64)  (2.64)  (2.99) 
RUR POP  0.7242
*** 0.6161
*** 0.1843 0.4870
*** 0.0948 0.0127 
  (6.57) (6.62) (1.32) (2.77)  (0.82)  (0.08) 




  (0.06) (0.58) (3.16) (2.73)  (1.78)  (1.50) 
RUR RPCM   0.0187
***  -0.0172
***  -0.0004 
   (4.40)  (2.87)    (0.08) 
CONTRIB       -0.0074
*** -0.0078
***
       (3.77)  (3.79) 
RUR USF   -0.0007   -0.0126
***  0.0077 
   (0.23)  (3.70)    (1.49) 
S271  -0.0247 0.0452
* -0.1358
** -0.1824
*** -0.0713 -0.0152 
  (0.53) (1.80) (2.21) (3.06)  (1.34)  (0.27) 
REP GOV  -0.0679
** -0.0205 -0.0739  -0.1450
*** 0.0041 0.0182 
  (2.04) (0.68) (1.50) (2.61)  (0.15)  (0.53) 






















  (5.63) (3.11) (1.91) (2.71)  (2.29)  (1.65) 
LCA  0.0016
*** 0.0006    0.0035
** 0.0038
**
  (2.85) (0.96)      (2.11)  (1.96) 
EMPLOY     -0.0006  -0.0006
* -0.0000 -0.0002 
     (0.63)  (1.80)  (0.05)  (0.31) 
SERVICE     -0.0492  -0.0204     
     (1.46)  (0.45)     
SMALL FIRMS     0.4123
* 0.4359
*   
     (1.69)  (1.73)     
AGE  0.0083 -0.0488
**       
  (0.31) (2.20)         
WHTE  0.0096 -0.0276
***       
  (0.84) (2.93)         
POVERTY  0.0151 -0.1337
***       
  (0.43) (3.41)         
PTLINES       0.1279
** 0.1461
**








 (27.12)  (26.69)  (15.41)  (12.93)  (16.59)  (15.80) 
Measured Service Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Hansen J Statistic  19.946
* 20.460 17.619 14.164  20.554  20.862 
Note. 
* significant at 0.1 level; 
** significant at 0.05 level; 
*** significant at 0.01 level. Absolute value of t-statistics in 
parenthesis. Standard errors used to calculate t-statistics are heteroskedasticity consistent and permit intra-state clustering 
among wire centers. Number of observations is 1,345. 
  44TABLE 8 
GMM ESTIMATES OF RURAL PRICE EQUATIONS 







  (3.19) (7.25) (1.85) (3.26)  (0.85)  (2.32) 
WPCM  0.0028 0.0015  0.0048
** 0.0033
***   
  (1.50) (0.88) (2.00) (2.88)     
BCPM  0.0054
*** 0.0125
***    0.0093
* 0.0056 
  (3.36) (8.37)      (1.79)  (0.74) 




     (1.93)  (3.47)  (0.61)  (1.64) 







  (2.07) (4.93) (3.58) (1.83)  (1.66)  (2.46) 
POP-EMP  -0.0003 -0.0152  0.0450
*** 0.0388
*** 0.0202 0.0283 
  (0.02) (0.95) (5.11) (6.09)  (0.75)  (1.35) 
URB BPCM   -0.0101
***  0.0064
***  -0.0035 
   (5.01)  (4.15)    (0.80) 
CONTRIB       0.0031  0.0023 
       (1.53)  (1.38) 
USF  0.0009 -0.0004  -0.0011 0.0001 -0.0052
** -0.0050
***
  (0.71) (0.36) (0.88) (0.04)  (2.08)  (2.89) 





  (0.42) (0.84) (1.71) (2.96)  (3.69)  (4.04) 
REP GOV  -0.0346 -0.0849
** -0.0278 0.0228 0.2509
** 0.2165
**
  (1.00) (2.55) (0.68) (0.93)  (2.75)  (2.36) 
REP PUC  0.0629
** 0.1141
*** 0.0770 0.030 -0.0550 -0.0221 
  (2.25) (4.15) (2.37) (1.36)  (0.56)  (0.25) 









*** 0.0342 0.0171 
  (2.04) (1.44) (3.26) (3.95)  (0.38)  (0.18) 
LCA  -0.0022 -0.0009      -0.0009  -0.0001 
  (0.76) (0.28)      (0.29)  (0.05) 





     (3.03)  (3.42)  (2.50)  (2.73) 
SERVICE     0.0312
* 0.0315
**   
     (1.92)  (2.30)     
SMALL FIRMS     -0.3394
*** -0.2963
***   
     (2.74)  (4.26)     
AGE  -0.0790
* -0.0013        
  (1.88) (0.03)         
WHTE  -0.0069 -0.0109         
  (0.19) (0.35)         
POVERTY  -0.0857 -0.0231         
  (1.52) (0.44)         
PTLINES       -0.8705
*** -0.9272
***








 (26.66)  (29.62)  (27.27)  (36.03)  (11.16)  (8.67) 
Measured Service Control  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Hansen J Statistic  22.157
* 17.798 20.665 21.247  15.571  19.087 
Note. 
* significant at 0.1 level; 
** significant at 0.05 level; 
*** significant at 0.01 level. Absolute value of t-statistics in 
parenthesis. Standard errors used to calculate t-statistics are heteroskedasticity consistent and permit intra-state clustering 
among wire centers. Number of observations is 4,212. 
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